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This paper examines the effectiveness of Japan’s Emergency Credit Guarantee (ECG) program set up during the 
financial turmoil following the failure of Lehman Brothers, in increasing credit availability and improving the ex-post 
performance of small businesses. In particular, using a unique firm-bank matched dataset, the paper examines whether 
lending relationships enhanced or dampened the effects of the ECG program. It is found that the ECG program 
significantly improved credit availability for firms using the program. However, when it is a relationship lender (main 
bank) that extends an ECG loan, the increased availability is partially, if not completely, offset by a decrease in non-ECG 
loans by the same bank. Further, propensity score matching estimations show that the ex-post performance of firms that 
received ECG loans from the main bank deteriorates more than that of firms that received non-ECG loans. We do not 
find such loan “substitution” or performance “deterioration” effects when a non-main bank extends ECG loans. Our 
findings suggest that close firm-bank relationships may have perverse effects on the efficacy of public credit guarantees. 
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1. Introduction 
The financial crisis that erupted after the failure of Lehman Brothers in the fall of 2008 prompted governments around 
the world to introduce various policy measures to help firms in distress, such as tax reductions, export facilitation 
measures, and measures to enhance firms’ access to credit. One of the most frequently employed measures is credit 
guarantee programs, which aim at improving credit availability for firms. For instance, OECD (2009) shows that 19 out 
of 23 OECD member countries introduced or strengthened credit guarantee programs following the onset of the crisis. 
Japan was among these countries. Along with a variety of other measures, the government introduced, at the 
end of October 2008, the Emergency Credit Guarantee Program (ECG program hereafter). This program is of particular 
interest to researchers because it is one of the largest single credit guarantee programs in OECD countries, with planned 
guarantees amounting to 36 trillion yen (approximately 400 billion U.S. dollars). The purpose of this study is to 
empirically examine with the help of a unique firm-bank matched dataset the effectiveness of this ECG program in 
increasing credit availability for firms and improving their ex-post performance. 
Although credit guarantee programs to assist small businesses in difficulties are widely used around the world, 
existing theoretical and empirical studies have yet to reach firm conclusions on their economic impact. In one strand of 
theoretical studies, credit guarantees may attenuate the credit rationing under asymmetric information between a 
borrower and a lender à la Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and may result in funding profitable projects that would not be 
realized without government intervention (Mankiw, 1986; Gale, 1990, 1991). Another strand in the literature suggests, 
however, that if the unfettered market (pooling) equilibrium under asymmetric information is such that some projects 
with a negative net present value are funded, then credit guarantees may exacerbate the “overlending” problem (de Meza 
and Webb, 1987; de Meza, 2002).    Empirical studies using micro data have generally found a positive impact of credit 
guarantees on the availability of credit to small businesses (Cowling, 2010; Riding, Madill, and Haines, 2007; Uesugi, 
Sakai, and Yamashiro, 2010; Zecchini and Ventura, 2009). However, the effect on the ex-post performance of credit 
guarantee users appears to be mixed (see, e.g., Riding and Haines, 2001; Kang and Heshmati, 2007; Oh, Lee, Choi, and 
Heshmati, 2009 that find positive effects; Uesugi, Sakai, and Yamashiro, 2010 that finds negative effects). 3 
 
Credit rationing (or overlending) under asymmetric information does not always necessitate the use of 
government interventions to credit markets including credit guarantees. Many of the studies on small business financing 
have argued that relationship lending reduces informational friction and enhances credit availability for firms, either in 
normal times or during a financial crisis (Angelini, Di Salvo, and Ferri, 1998; Cole, 1998; Jiangli, Unal, and Yom, 2008; 
Petersen and Rajan, 1994). However, an issue that has not been addressed in the literature so far is how firm-bank 
relationships affect the economic effects of public credit guarantee programs. 
On the one hand, if a relationship lender uses the credit guarantee program in order to supplement its efforts to 
help borrowers in temporary distress, then it is likely that the provision of guaranteed loans will be associated with an 
increase in non-guaranteed loans and result in an improvement in the ex-post performance of borrower firms. On the 
other hand, close firm-bank relationships may have negative effects if the credit guarantee program provides the 
relationship lender with an opportunity to exploit its informational advantages. Similar to the problem of conflicts of 
interest for bank underwriting of corporate bonds (in which an informed bank underwrites and distributes corporate 
bonds of low quality firms to outside investors in order to redeem its existing loans), an informed relationship lender 
may switch loans to risky firms from non-guaranteed to guaranteed loans, thus transferring the credit risk to the public 
credit guarantee program. If this is the case, we would observe a decrease in non-guaranteed loans and a deterioration in 
the ex-post performance of borrowers that obtained guaranteed loans from relationship lenders. 
Using a unique firm-bank matched panel dataset of about 2,500 observations during the current financial crisis, 
we examine whether the ECG program was effective in increasing the availability of small business loans and improving 
borrower firms’ performance. In particular, we investigate whether lending relationships (defined as a situation where the 
lender is the main bank of the firm) enhanced or dampened the effects of the ECG program. 
Our dataset contains a range of information that is particularly valuable for our analysis. First, we can identify 
user firms of the ECG program as well as non-users. Thus, we are able to identify the factors that affect the availability 
of credit both for users and non-users of the program and to determine the effects of the program. Second, and most 
importantly, we can identify the “main bank” and non-main banks of a firm. This allows us to explore how lending 4 
 
relationships interact with the usage of the ECG program, which is the primary concern of this paper. Further, for each 
firm-bank match, we can identify the amount of individual ECG loans and the amount of total loans outstanding, 
including both ECG loans and non-ECG loans provided by the same bank. Hence, we are able to make inferences on the 
changes in a bank’s existing loans at the time the bank extends an ECG loan. Finally, although only for a short-time 
horizon (one year after ECG loans were provided), we have ex-post performance variables that are useful in evaluating 
the efficacy of the ECG program. 
The major empirical findings are as follows. The ECG program significantly improved the availability of credit 
for program user firms. However, when it is the main bank of a firm that extends an ECG loan, the positive effect of the 
program is partially, if not completely, offset by a decrease in non-ECG loans by the main bank. Further, ex-post 
creditworthiness (the credit score one year later) of ECG program users deteriorated more than that of non-users. Such 
loan “substitution” effects do not necessarily occur when ECG loans were extended by non-main banks. These findings 
suggest that close firm-bank relationships may have perverse effects on the efficacy of the public credit guarantees 
program. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the credit guarantee system in 
Japan, with particular attention paid to the ECG program. Section 3 then presents our empirical hypotheses, while 
Section 4 describes the data, variables, and empirical approach employed. Section 5 presents the empirical results. 
Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Public Credit Guarantees in Japan 
2.1. The Credit Guarantee System 
Even before the recent financial crisis, the Japanese government had introduced a variety of programs to facilitate the 
flow of funds to small and medium enterprises (SMEs), including direct lending by government-backed financial 
institutions as well as loan guarantee schemes. In terms of the amount of loans outstanding, government credit 
guarantees have been used more extensively than direct loans. Further, the use rate of guarantees is far higher than that of 5 
 
direct loans, with nearly 40 percent of all Japanese SMEs having received guarantees. 
Three parties are involved in credit guarantee transactions in Japan: a small business borrower, a financial 
institution, and a credit guarantee corporation, which is financially backed by the government. In order to obtain 
guaranteed loans, small businesses have to first file an application with a credit guarantee corporation. In practice, most 
applications are filed by financial institutions on behalf of small business borrowers, although some firms file 
applications on their own behalf. In the first case, the financial institution may conduct a preliminary screening before it 
actually delivers the application to a credit guarantee corporation. Next, the credit guarantee corporation examines the 
application and makes a credit decision. Finally, based on a letter of approval from the credit guarantee corporation, the 
financial institution extends a loan to the small business. The borrowing firm is then required to pay a guarantee 
premium, with the amount in principle depending on the credit risk of the firm. The average premium is about 1.35 
percent of the total loan amount extended. In the case that the firm is unable to repay its debt to the bank, the debt is 
covered by the credit guarantee corporation, which takes over the loan claim from the bank. In most cases credit 
guarantees extend to 80 percent of the loan amount.
1  Finally, the credit guarantee corporation, or a debt collection agent 
acting on behalf of it, will try to collect part or all of the loan, for example by assisting in the restructuring of the firms – 
a process that may take considerable time. 
 
2.2. The Emergency Credit Guarantee Program 
In response to the financial crisis that started in the fall of 2008, the Japanese government introduced various stimulus 
measures in order to alleviate the massive adverse shocks to the economy. These measures include a temporary corporate 
tax reduction, lump-sum cash handouts to households, and larger employment adjustment subsidies. Moreover, 
supplementing the regular credit guarantee scheme just discussed, the government on October 31, 2008, introduced the 
ECG program as a temporary rescue measure. The program is scheduled to expire at the end of March 2011. With credit 
guarantees of up to 36 trillion yen, the size of the ECG program is unprecedented, surpassing that of a previous 
                                                        
1 Until October 2007, such credit guarantees extended to 100 percent of the loan amount, but changes in government policy 
subsequently reduced that to 80 percent. 6 
 
temporary program, the Special Credit Guarantee Program (SCG program) (30 trillion yen) implemented from October 
1998 to March 2001. The size of the credit facility is equivalent to about 15 percent of total SME loans outstanding in 
Japan. By the end of March 2010, the amount of ECG loans extended stood at almost 20 trillion yen. 
  In comparison with the regular credit guarantee program, the ECG program has the following institutional 
features. First, the ratio of credit covered by credit guarantee corporations is 100 percent; thus, banks that extend ECG 
loans bear no credit risks. Second, the maximum duration of an ECG loan is ten years, whereas that of a regular credit 
guaranteed loan is seven years. Third, guarantee premiums, most of which are set at about 0.75-0.80 percent of the loan 
amount, are lower than the average premium charged to regular program users. Moreover, in contrast with the regular 
program, where the premium varies between 0.45 to 1.9 percent with the average of 1.15 percent depending on the 
borrowing firm’s credit risk, the premium for ECG loans is a fixed percentage set by each credit corporation in order to 
reduce the payment burden for risky borrowers. Finally, while the risk weight of regular credit guaranteed loans under 
the Basel II Capital Accord is 10 percent, the risk weight of the ECG loans is set to 0 percent in order to facilitate the use 
of the ECG program by banks. 
  As mentioned, the Japanese government implemented a similar temporary credit guarantee program, the SCG 
program, in the midst of the financial crisis during the late 1990s. The purpose of the SCG program was to alleviate the 
severe credit crunch for small businesses caused by the non-performing loan problem faced by Japanese banks. Thus, it 
should be noted that the current situation is quite the opposite of that which prompted the SCG program; that is, whereas 
the SCG program was launched in response to problems in the financial sector, the ECG program was introduced to deal 
with the sharp decline in business activity and firms’ worsening financial position.   
Comparing the ECG program and the SCG program, both similarities and differences can be observed. As for 
similarities, the credit coverage by credit guarantee corporations in both programs is 100 percent.
2 In addition, both 
programs in principle do not ask borrower firms to pledge collateral. 
On the other hand, there are also substantial differences between the ECG and the SCG program. First, the loan 
                                                        
2  However, at the time of SCG program, the credit coverage of the regular program was also 100 percent, while at present it is 
only 80 percent. 7 
 
screening policy of the ECG program is stricter than that of the SCG program. A loan application under the SCG 
program could be rejected only if a prospective borrower breached certain minimum conditions such as not having 
significant negative net worth, not being tax delinquent, not having defaulted, and not having engaged in balance sheet 
window dressing. In contrast, under the ECG program, approvals are not automatic and are subject to a strict screening 
process. The difference may be due to the huge deficits that credit guarantee corporations currently have, as well as 
widespread criticism of the SCG program with regard to its lenient screening policy and resulting misuse of funds, as 
evidenced by a number of anecdotes.
3  On the other hand, in terms of the maximum size and duration of loans, the ECG 
program allows user firms to borrow a larger amount for a longer period of time than the SCG program: the maximum 
amount and duration of ECG loans are 280 million yen and ten years, respectively, whereas those of the SCG loans were 
250 million yen and seven years, respectively.   
 
3. Empirical Hypotheses 
3.1. Effects of Credit Guarantees 
The economic effects of public credit guarantees have been analyzed in a variety of theoretical studies. Many of these 
studies are based on the presumption that the adverse selection problem under asymmetric information between 
borrowers and lenders results in an undersupply, or rationing, of credit à la Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Thus, in these 
theoretical analyses, the introduction of public credit guarantees results in an increase in the availability of loans for 
previously unfunded projects and may contribute to restoring efficiency in the credit market (Mankiw, 1986; Gale, 1990, 
1991). On the other hand, using an alternative model, de Meza and Webb (1987) argue that, under the assumption that 
investment returns are ranked in terms of first-order stochastic dominance,
4 asymmetric information will result in an 
excess supply of credit and yield “too much investment.” In the analytical framework of de Meza and Webb (1987), 
public credit guarantees will also increase the availability of loans to firms, but exacerbate the problem of 
                                                        
3  For a detailed account of the SCG program, see Uesugi, Sakai, and Yamashiro (2010). 
4 The theoretical model in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) assumes second-order stochastic dominance. The contrasting results 
between Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and de Meza and Webb (1987) rest on the different assumptions with regard to the 
risk-return relationship of investment projects. See Freixas and Rochet (2008, p.177) and de Meza (2002). 8 
 
over-investment by low-quality borrowers (de Meza, 2002; Innes 1991). 
  Note that even in theoretical models based on Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), public credit guarantees do not 
necessarily ensure improvements in the average quality of projects implemented. Hence, whether the public guarantees 
will improve the ex-post performance of program users is an empirical matter. Moreover, several contractual features of 
the ECG program may worsen the ex-post performance of borrowers. First, the 100 percent coverage of default costs by 
the credit guarantee corporation significantly reduces banks’ incentives to monitor borrower firms (lender moral hazard). 
Second, the lack of requirement for collateral in the ECG program may also exacerbate the moral hazard problem on the 
part of borrower firms by resulting in reduced managerial effort (Boot, Thakor, and Udell, 1991) and/or asset substitution 
(Stulz and Johnson, 1985). Based on these considerations, our first empirical hypothesis is as follows:   
 
Hypothesis 1 (Effects of Credit Guarantees): Loan availability increases for users of public credit guarantees. In 
addition, the ex-post performance of firms using credit guarantees improves if increased credit is used for profitable 
projects with a positive net present value. Alternatively, the ex-post performance of guarantee user firms deteriorates if 
increased credit exacerbates the over-investment problem and/or results in moral hazard problems. 
 
Previous empirical studies on credit guarantees generally find that credit guarantees have a positive impact on 
the availability of credit for small businesses (see, e.g., Cowling (2010) for Britain; Riding, Madill, and Haines (2007) 
for Canada; Uesugi, Sakai, and Yamashiro (2010) for Japan; and Zecchini and Ventura (2009) for Italy). However, the 
evidence on the ex-post performance of guarantee users is mixed. Riding and Haines (2001), for example, find positive 
job creation amongst Canadian guarantee program users. They also note that the default rates of program users are 
particularly sensitive to the coverage ratio of the guarantee program. Using firm level data of Korean credit guarantee 
user and non-user firms, Kang and Heshmati (2007) and Oh et al. (2009) examine the determinants of guarantee use and 
the ex-post performance of guarantee users. Although the two studies employ different empirical approaches (Heckman’s 
two-step estimation in the case of the former and propensity score matching estimation in the case of the latter), both find 9 
 
that the use of credit guarantees positively affects the growth of sales and reduces the default rate of firms. Oh et al. 
(2009) suggest that the decline in the default rate may be evidence of credit rationing in the absence of credit guarantee 
programs. On the other hand, the evidence on employment growth and productivity growth in the two studies is mixed, 
while both do not find a significant effect on investment. Finally, using Japanese firm level data and employing 
propensity score matching, Uesugi, Sakai, and Yamashiro (2010) find that firms that participated in the SCG program in 
the late 1990s tended to experience a decrease in profitability and saw an increase in the probability of financial distress 
and default. 
 
3.2. Main Bank Relationships and Effects of Credit Guarantees 
As noted earlier, a number of theoretical and empirical studies have examined whether close firm-bank relationships 
reduce informational friction between a borrower and a lender and thus improve the availability of credit, especially for 
smaller and younger firms that are more informationally opaque (e.g., Angelini, Di Salvo, and Ferri, 1998; Cole, 1998; 
Jiangli, Unal, and Yom, 2008; Petersen and Rajan, 1994). What has not received much attention in the literature, however, 
is how firm-bank relationships affect the economic effects of public credit guarantee programs. 
  On the one hand, a relationship lender (a main bank in our analysis) may use the credit guarantee program to 
supplement its efforts to help borrowers in temporary distress. If that is the case, then it is likely that the guaranteed loans 
are complimentary to non-guaranteed loans provided by the relationship lender and hence increases not only the 
availability of guaranteed loans but also the availability of non-guaranteed loans. Moreover, the provision of guaranteed 
loans through relationship lenders, based on the soft information they have accumulated, is likely to result in the 
improvement of ex-post performance of borrower firms. Such complementarity between lending relationships and the 
credit guarantee program may well appear if banks are risk-averse and/or the size of loans is sufficiently large so that 
banks have an incentive for risk-sharing. 
On the other hand, it is also possible that banks may want to substitute guaranteed loans for existing loans 
(Vogel and Adams, 1997). In this case, close firm-bank relationships may be detrimental for the effectiveness of credit 10 
 
guarantees program, because relationship lenders will exploit their informational advantages. Similar to the problem of 
conflicts of interest for bank underwriting of corporate bonds in which an informed bank underwrites and distributes 
corporate bonds of low quality firms to outside investors in order to redeem its existing loans,
5  an informed relationship 
lender may switch from non-guaranteed loans to guaranteed loans, and thus transfer credit risks of deteriorating firms to 
the public credit guarantee program. Thus, we would observe a decrease in non-guaranteed loans and a deterioration in 
the ex-post performance of borrowers that have obtained a guaranteed loan from their relationship lender. These possible 
effects are summarized in our next hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2 (Main Bank Relationships and the Effects of Credit Guarantees): Credit availability and firms’ ex-post 
performance improve if the main bank uses the guarantee program in order to augment its efforts to support firms in 
difficulties. Alternatively, credit availability and firms’ ex-post performance deteriorate if the main bank exploits its 
informational advantages to identify low quality firms, substitutes guaranteed loans for non-guaranteed loans, and 
transfers credit risks to the guarantee program. 
 
  Note that the relationship between non-guaranteed loans and guaranteed loans also depends on the institutional 
features of credit guarantee programs. As discussed in Riding, Madill, and Haines (2007), guarantee programs in the 
United States are designed to act as lenders of last resort, and are provided only to small businesses that fail to find other 
sources of financing. Loan guarantee programs in other countries, such as Canada and Britain, allow credit guarantee 
applicants to have their own non-guaranteed loan balances, but are also explicit in their stated objective that the majority 
of firms obtaining guaranteed loans should be firms that have been unable to obtain financing from alternative sources.
6 
In these countries, guaranteed loans are almost always substitutes for non-guaranteed loans. Nevertheless, our empirical 
                                                        
5 There are a number of studies that have empirically examined whether the pricing and default performance of corporate 
bonds underwritten by commercial banks or their affiliates are consistent with the conflict-of-interest hypothesis. See, for 
instance, Kroszner and Rajan (1994, 1997) and Puri (1996) on the pre-Glass-Steagall-Act period in the United States, Gande et 
al. (1997) on Section 20 subsidiaries during the pre-Gramm-Leach-Bliley-Act period in the United States, and Hamao and 
Hoshi (2000) and Kang and Liu (2007) on the post-1933 Financial System Reform Act-period in Japan. 
6  This principle is referred to as additionality or incrementality. 11 
 
hypothesis may shed light on the effectiveness of credit guarantees in these countries as well, because relationship 
lenders in these countries also have incentives and opportunities to exploit their informational advantages at the expense 
of public guarantee programs. 
 
4. Data and Empirical Approach 
4.1. Data Sources 
The data used in this study are mainly taken from the Kigyo Kinyukikan tono Torihiki Jittai Chosa (Survey on Inter-firm 
and Firm–Bank Transactions) in February 2008 and the Kinyukikika ni okeru Kigyo Kinyukikan tono Torihiki Jittai 
Chosa (Survey on Inter-firm and Firm-bank Transactions during the Financial Crisis) in February 2009.
7 Both  surveys 
were conducted by the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry, a research institution affiliated with the 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan, and will be referred to as “RIETI surveys” hereafter. These RIETI 
surveys asked firms about a variety of issues such as the uses of credit guarantees, the amount of guaranteed loans 
obtained, the total loan amount outstanding, and their relationships with banks (e.g., the duration of their banking 
relationships). Further, the 2009 survey included several questions regarding the impact of the financial crisis following 
the failure of Lehman Brothers in the fall of 2008, including the use of the ECG program.   
The 2008 survey questionnaire was sent to 17,018 firms chosen from firms that had responded to previous 
government surveys compiled by the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency. Firms surveyed were randomly drawn from 
the database of Tokyo Shoko Research (hereafter TSR database), a business database company. The TSR database covers 
more than 1.2 million Japanese firms and maintains information on firms’ financial statements as well as their primary 
characteristics, including the firm age, ownership structure of the firm, and the identity of banks they transact with. The 
number of respondent firms to the 2008 survey is 6,079, for response rate of 35.7 percent. The size distribution of these 
responding firms compared with that of the original sample is slightly more bunched around the center, i.e., fewer firms 
are distributed at both tails. The 2009 survey questionnaire was sent to 5,979 firms, those that responded to the 2008 
                                                        
7  A paper summarizing the results of these surveys (Uesugi et al. 2009) is available in Japanese. 12 
 
survey excluding defaulters. The number of respondent firms in the year is 4,103, for a response rate of 68.6 percent. 
Based on these respondent firms to the 2008 and 2009 surveys, we produce a balanced firm-bank matched panel dataset 
used for our analysis. 
The RIETI surveys have a few notable features that are particularly suitable for testing the effectiveness of the 
credit guarantee programs. First, for each firm, the surveys identify at most two banks (deposit-taking financial 
institutions) with which firms have the largest and the second-largest amount of loans outstanding. Hence, we are able to 
concatenate the financial characteristics of these banks that may affect firms’ availability of credit. In addition, the 
surveys also identify the main bank of a firm, and we use the information in order to define which bank is the 
relationship lender of a firm. 89 percent of firms in our dataset respond that their main bank is the same as the bank with 
which it has the largest amount of loans outstanding. Second, for each firm-bank match in which a bank is either a main 
bank or a non-main bank, the 2009 survey identifies the use of ECG loans including the loan amount. In addition, the 
RIETI surveys identify the amount of total loans outstanding of a particular firm, including both ECG loans and 
non-ECG loans in the years 2008 and 2009. Hence, we are able to examine not only the amount of ECG loans extended 
to a firm but also the change between 2008 and 2009 in the amount of non-ECG loans outstanding to the firm. Non-ECG 
loans consist of regular credit guaranteed loans and non-guaranteed loans, and 39.4 percent of our firm-bank matched 
observations include loans with regular credit guarantees. 
Other than the RIETI surveys, we employ the TSR database where we obtain firms’ financial data. Firms 
whose most recent financial statements in the TSR database are before January 2008 are excluded from our dataset. Next, 
we employ another set of data sources for the financial status of main and non-main banks. The main source for this 
information is the Financial QUEST database provided by Nikkei Media Marketing, Inc., with missing data 
supplemented from the website of the Financial Services Agency, which provides information on regional financial 
institutions,
8 and from banks’ annual reports. Observations for which we cannot obtain data on banks (e.g., credit 
cooperatives) are dropped from our dataset.   
                                                        
8 http://www.fsa.go.jp/policy/chusho/shihyou.html 13 
 
Using these data sources, we construct a firm-bank matched panel dataset with the dependent and independent 
variables explained in the following subsection. Because of the exclusion of observations explained above, as well as 
occasional missing answers to the RIETI surveys,
9  we are left with 2,498 firm-bank matched observations (1,732 firms), 




We have several sets of variables to examine our empirical hypotheses. A list of variables and their definitions are 
presented in Table 1. 
 
4.2.1. Availability of Loans and Ex-post Performance 
First, in order to gauge the amount of loans available to a firm, we use several loan variables, controlling for firm size by 
dividing the loan amount by the firm’s total assets in 2008. The first variable is the amount of ECG loans the firm 
obtained from a particular bank (ECG_LOAN_RATIO), the second is the change between the February 2008 and 
February 2009 RIETI surveys in the amount of outstanding loans from a particular bank (dB_LOAN_RATIO), and the 
third is the change between the two surveys in the total amount of the firm’s outstanding loans from all financial 
institutions (dB_TLOAN_RATIO). Because dB_LOAN_RATIO consists of ECG loans and non-ECG loans (regular 
credit guaranteed loans and non-guaranteed loans), the difference between dB_LOAN_RATIO and ECG_LOAN_RATIO 
represents the change in the amount of non-ECG loans within a firm-bank match. In contrast, the difference between 
dB_TLOAN_RATIO and dB_LOAN_RATIO represents the change in the amount of loans from other banks. 
Another variable we use, which is somewhat similar to dB_TLOAN_RATIO, is dLOAN_RATIO, the change 
in total loans from both financial institutions and non-financial institutions (such as parent companies, owners, etc.). The 
virtue of dLOAN_RATIO is that we can divide it into short-term loans (dSHORT_RATIO) and long-term loans 
                                                        
9  The most frequently missing variables are the identity of the main bank and non-main banks as well as the firm-bank 
relationship variables described below. 14 
 
(dLONG_RATIO), so that we can make inferences on how the use of ECG loans affects the maturity of a firm’s loans 
outstanding. 
  Second, we construct a set of variables in order to see how firms allocate ECG loans and how their 
performance changes. Note that all the variables below are yearly differences between 2008 and 2009, so that we 
effectively look at changes within the year after ECG loans were extended. Again, variables with “RATIO” are adjusted 
for firm size using total assets in 2008. To see how ECG loans are allocated, we use dCASHRATIO and 
dTANGIBLERATIO, which measure changes in the liquidity position and investment activity of a firm, respectively. 
Proxies for a firm’s ex-post performances are dROA (return on assets to measure profitability), dSCORE (the TSR credit 
score to measure a firm’s creditworthiness), and dlnEMP (the number of employees in logarithm to measure a firm’s 
size). The change in ROA can be decomposed into the change in gross sales (dSALESRATIO) and the change in 
operating costs (dCOSTRATIO). dRATE (interest payments divided by a firm’s total assets) is also employed to see 
whether the use of ECG loans contributes to a decrease in interest payments.   
 
4.2.2. Determinants of the use of ECG program 
To examine the determinants of the use of the ECG program, we consider four categories of variables: 
characteristics of credit guarantees, borrower firm characteristics, characteristics of the bank (either a main bank or a 
non-main bank) that extends ECG or non-ECG loans, and variables describing the relationship between a firm and the 
bank that extends the ECG or non-ECG loans. Table 2 presents summary statistics of these variables, with the left, center, 
and right blocks of columns presenting summary statistics for the full-sample of firm-bank matches, for the firm-bank 
matches where ECG loans are extended, and for the firm-bank matches where non-ECG loans are extended, respectively. 
Tables 3 and 4 present similar summary statistics for firm-main bank matches and firm-non-main bank matches, 
respectively. 
  The dependent variable, ECG_DUM, is a dummy variable that equals one if a borrower firm obtained ECG 
loans between October 31, 2008 (the onset of ECG Program) and February 2009 (when the 2009 RIETI survey was 15 
 
conducted). In about 15 percent of firm-bank matches in our entire sample, the ECG program was used during this 
period (Table 2). Tables 3 and 4 indicate that the ratio is substantially higher for firm-main bank matches (21.2 percent) 
than for firm-non-main bank matches (4.7 percent), indicating that ECG loans are more likely to be provided by main 
banks. 
  As noted above, we consider four categories of independent variables: characteristics of credit guarantees, firm 
characteristics, bank characteristics, and bank-firm relationships. Firm and bank characteristics variables are as of 2008 
(one year prior to the 2009 RIETI survey), whereas bank-firm relationship variables are as of February 2009. A few 
things are worth mentioning. 
First, in 39.4 percent of firm-bank matches in our entire sample, regular credit guarantee (RCG) loans were 
used at the time of the 2009 RIETI survey. Among ECG loan users, the ratio of firms that have also obtained regular 
credit guarantees program loans (RCG_DUM) is 76.2 percent, implying that ECG loans are used supplementary to 
regular program loans. Second, regarding firm characteristics, we find that the profitability (SHARPERATIO) and 
creditworthiness (SCORE) of ECG loan users are lower on average than those of non-ECG loan users, and the difference 
in these variables between the two groups (e.g., SCOREECG_DUM=1 –SCOREECG_DUM=0) is greater for firm-main bank 
matches than for firm-non-main bank matches. That is, the relative performance of ECG loan user is worse if the firm 
obtains the ECG loan from its main bank. 
Third, the mean values of the regional bank dummy B_REGIONAL indicate that ECG loans are more likely to 
be provided by regional banks, especially when the regional bank is the main bank of a firm. Table 3 shows that, within 
the subsample of firm-main bank matches, 87.4 percent of ECG loan are extended by regional banks, whereas the ratio is 
70.9 percent for non-ECG loans. Fourth, other variables on bank characteristics include the Herfindahl index calculated 
for each prefecture (HHI) and the bank’s share of branches within the prefecture of a borrowing firm (BANKSHARE). 
The former variable represents the degree of competition among banks in each prefecture, while the latter proxies the 
bargaining power of a bank vis-à-vis a credit guarantee corporation in a particular prefecture. Table 2 shows that the 
values for HHI are quite similar between firm-bank matches with ECG loans and those with non-ECG loans, 0.113 and 16 
 
0.106, respectively. On the other hand, the table shows a positive association between BANKSHARE and the use of 
ECG loans, that is, the higher the share a bank has in the local loan market, the more frequently the bank extends ECG 
loans. 
  Lastly, the dummy variable LOAN_ENQUIRY represents whether a firm requested a loan within the year, and 
we treat this variable as a proxy for loan demand. For firm-main bank matches (Table 3), the mean value of 
LOAN_ENQUIRY is higher for ECG loan user firms (0.506) than that for non-users (0.368), indicating that the use of 
the ECG program is positively associated with the strength of firms’ loan demand. In contrast, for firm-non-main bank 
matches (Table 4), the use of the ECG program is negatively associated with LOAN_ENQUIRY (0.170 for ECG loan 
users and 0.292 for non-users). This suggests that in these instances, firms obtain ECG loans as a result of solicitations 
from non-main banks rather than enquiries of their own accord. 
 
4.3. Empirical Approach 
Using the dataset just described, we proceed to examine the economic effects of the ECG program. Note, however, that a 
simple comparison of the availability of loans for, and ex-post performance of, ECG program users and non-users is not 
appropriate because of possible selection bias. For example, if firms that obtain ECG loans are ex-ante observably riskier 
than those not using the ECG program, then a simple comparison between the two groups confounds ex-ante riskiness 
and ex-post riskiness (changes in borrowers’ riskiness after the loan is extended). To circumvent this problem, we need to 
control for any possible selection bias in our estimation. To do so, we employ the matching estimation approach. The 
procedure is as follows: 
(i) We implement a probit estimation that models the probability of firms’ using the ECG program between October 31, 
2008, and February 2009 conditional on firm characteristics, bank characteristics, and bank-firm relationships. 
Borrowers that obtain ECG loans (ECG_DUM=1) are labeled treatment observations. We then attach a propensity score 
to each observation. The propensity score is defined as 
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where Xt-1 is a vector of covariates in the probit estimation. 
(ii) Next, for each treatment observation, we identify matched observations from the sample of non-ECG users. The 
matched observations are those that have the “closest” propensity scores to a particular treatment observation and are 
labeled control observations. It should be noted that we may use non-treated observations more than once as a control 
observation, that is, a non-treatment observation may be used as a control observation for one treatment observation and 
as a control observation for another treatment observation at the same time. There are several matching algorithms to 
find the “closest” control observations. As a baseline for our analysis, we employ kernel matching. 
(iii) Finally, we compare the change (difference between 2009 and 2008) in the loan availability and ex-post performance 
variables of the treatment and the control group as described in the previous subsection. To be precise, for ex-post 
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indicates the loan availability variable, t is the year in which firms decide whether to use the ECG program, and 
superscripts T, i and C, i stand for the treatment firm i and its control group firms, respectively.   
With respect to loan availability variables, we measure the changes from year t-1 to t, because we would like to 
know the contemporaneous effects of an ECG loan to a firm on non-ECG loans from the same bank and non-ECG loans 
from other banks. 
One of the benefits of employing propensity score matching estimation is that we can match treatment and 
control observations using the scalar propensity score. The propensity score, which is the conditional probability of being 
treated given the value of observed characteristics, is a very useful variable in dealing with a highly dimensional vector 
of covariates. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) showed that treatment observations (in our case firms that obtain ECG 
loans) and control observations (those that obtain non-ECG loans) with the same propensity score value have the same 
distribution of the full vector of covariates. It is thus sufficient to match firms in terms of the propensity score in order to 
obtain the same probability distribution of covariates for treatment and control observations. 
In propensity score matching, an assumption known as unconfoundedness has to be satisfied so that the 
differences in ex-post performance variables between the treated observations and the control observations with the same 18 
 
propensity scores are attributable to the treatment effect of using the ECG program (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). That 
is,  




t X e DUM ECG Y Y     
needs to hold. Although there is no direct test for unconfoundedness, this assumption means that it is necessary to control 
for all relevant variables Xt-1 that influence the selection of treatment observations and their ex-post performance 
variables. We believe that our data is rich enough to include all the necessary covariates. Furthermore, the DID matching 
estimator that we use allows for the existence of differences in time-invariant unobservable characteristics between the 
treatment and the control group. 
 
5．Results 
We use a probit model in order to estimate a propensity score for each firm-bank match observation in Section 5.1, 
followed by the treatment effect estimation in Section 5.2. Further, in Section 5.3, we explicitly focus on the quantitative 
impact of the ECG program in terms of the increase in firms’ total loans from banks. Specifically, using OLS regression, 
we examine by how many percentage points the total loan ratio increases as a result of a one percentage point increase in 
the ECG loan ratio.   
 
5.1. Probit model estimation 
We start our estimation procedure with the probit model equation, as specified in equation (1): 
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We have two groups of firm-bank matched observations: firm-main bank matches and firm-non-main bank matches. 
There may well be different coefficients between these two groups. We first divide the entire set of observations into 19 
 
these two groups and estimate equation (1) for each of them. Then we conduct our estimation for the entire sample. 
The estimation results are presented in Table 5. The left, center, and right blocks represent the parameters for 
the sample of firm-main bank matches, the sample of firm-non-main bank matches, and the sample of all firm-bank 
matches, respectively. For the firm-main bank matched sample, the coefficient on RCG_DUM is significantly positive, 
indicating that the use of Emergency Credit Guarantees and the use of regular credit guarantees are complementary. 
As for firm characteristics, the coefficients on SCORE and CAPRATIO_NG are negative and significant. This 
indicates that firms with a low creditworthiness are more likely to use the ECG program, but are less likely to obtain 
ECG loans once they become distressed to the point that their capital ratio is negative, presumably because of the 
relatively stringent lending standards under the ECG program. In contrast, the profitability of firms (SHARPERATIO) 
does not have a significant effect on the use of the ECG program. The coefficient on LOANRATIO is significantly 
positive and that on lnSALES significantly negative, while that on lnFIRMAGE is insignificant. That is, firms with a 
greater reliance on debt-financing and smaller firms are more likely to use the program. A firm’s demand for loans, as 
proxied by LOAN_ENQUIRY, has a significant positive effect on the use of the ECG program. 
Turning to bank characteristics in the firm-main bank matched sample, the capital-asset ratio based on the 
Basel Capital Accord has different impacts on the use of Emergency Credit Guarantees depending on the type of the 
bank each firm transacts with. If it is a regional bank, the impact of the bank’s capital-asset ratio (the sum of the 
coefficients on B_REGIONAL*BIS and BIS) is not significant on the use of the program. In contrast, if it is a city bank 
or other large bank, use of the program is negatively associated with its capital-asset ratio. The difference between city 
banks and regional banks implies that the former, most of which need to abide by the more stringent capital requirements 
applied to banks operating internationally, face greater pressure to have a larger capital buffer. Hence, city banks are 
more likely to provide ECG loans whose risk weight (0 percent) is smaller than that of non-ECG loans. The coefficient 
on HHI is negative and weakly significant, indicating that firms located in a prefecture with fiercer competition among 
banks are more likely to obtain ECG loans. In contrast, the coefficient on BANKSHARE is positive, but insignificant. 
  It is worth comparing the above results with those for the firm-non-main bank matched sample. As in the 20 
 
estimation for the firm-main bank matched sample, the coefficients on RCG_DUM and LOANRATIO are positive and 
significant. Moreover, the coefficients on the variables for bank characteristics have the same sign. Turning to firm 
characteristics, the coefficient on CAPRATIO_NG is also negative for the firm-non-main bank sample, but it is 
significant only at the 10 percent level. On the other hand, SCORE and lnSALES become insignificant, meaning that 
unlike firms that obtain ECG loans from their main bank, firms that obtain ECG loans from non-main banks are neither 
riskier nor smaller than the sample population. Further, the coefficient on LOAN_ENQUIRY turns significantly negative, 
indicating that firms not actively seeking a loan were likely to be solicited by non-main banks to use the ECG program. 
  Finally, we conduct the probit model estimation for the entire sample. We introduce an interaction term 
between B_MAIN and LOAN_ENQUIRY, since the effect of borrowers’ loan demand on the use of ECG loans differs 
between the two subsamples. Consistent with the summary statistics, ECG loans are more likely to be extended by the 
main bank, as indicated by coefficients on B_MAIN and B_MAIN*ENQUIRY. The results for the other variables appear 
to be more in line with the results for firm-main bank matched observations than those for firm-non-main bank matches. 
In addition, some of the variables which are insignificant or only marginally significant in the subsample estimations 
become significant due to smaller standard errors. Specifically, this is the case for BANKSHARE and HHI. In the next 
subsection, we use the estimation results for the entire sample in order to calculate propensity scores and then implement 
the treatment effect estimation.   
 
5.2. Treatment effect estimation 
Based on the propensity scores obtained from the probit model regression for the entire sample in the previous 
subsection, we estimate the treatment effect of the ECG program using kernel matching estimators. We match each 
treated observation with the non-treated observations, each of which has its own weight that is proportional to the 
“closeness” to the treated observation. Here, closeness is measured by the propensity scores of treated and non-treated 
observations. Note that we omit non-treated observations of the same firm receiving an ECG loan from another bank 
from the entire sample. We do this in order to avoid that the same firm appears both in the treatment and control groups. 21 
 
  The estimation results for the treatment effect are reported in Table 6. Panel (a) shows the result for the entire 
sample, which we consider as the baseline case. Panels (b) and (c) present the results for the subsamples of firm-main 
bank matches and firm-non-main bank matches, respectively. For each of the variables, there is an unmatched estimator 
and an ATT (average treatment effect on the treated) estimator, both of which are shown in the column labeled 
“Difference.”  
For example, in the “Unmatched” row for the variable dB_LOAN_RATIO in Panel (a), there are two values, 
one for the treatment group (in this case, firm-bank matches with ECG loans) and one for the non-treatment group 
(firm-bank matches without ECG loans), which are 0.050 and 0.008, respectively. The former value indicates that, 
between 2008 and 2009, an ECG user’s borrowing from a bank on average increased by an amount equivalent to 5.0 
percent of the firm’s total assets, while the latter indicates that a non-ECG user’s borrowing from a bank during the same 
period increased by an amount equivalent to 0.8 percent of its total assets. The difference between these two figures, 4.2 
percentage points, shown in the column labeled “Difference,” is the unmatched estimate of the treatment effect. Note, 
however, that the unmatched estimate may well be biased since ex-ante differences in terms of firm characteristics 
between ECG users and non-users possibly affect the differences in ex-post firm performance. By contrast, the average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATT) estimator resolves the bias caused by the sample selection. In “ATT” row, the value 
for the non-treatment group in the “Unmatched” row is replaced by the value for the control group, in which firms are 
non-ECG users but similar to the ECG users in their characteristics. The difference between the value in the treatment 
and that in the control, which is equivalent to 5.0 percent of a firm’s total assets, is what we aim to obtain as the 
treatment effect incurred by the use of the ECG program. 
We start from the baseline case in panel (a) of Table 6. For the loan availability variables, we observe 
significant improvements in most of the variables. Not only changes in loans from a bank (dB_LOAN_RATIO), but also 
changes in a firm’s total loans outstanding from banks (dB_TLOAN_RATIO) and changes in a firm’s total loans 
outstanding (dLOAN_RATIO) show significant positive treatment effects. Looking at the components of 
dLOAN_RATIO, changes in a firm’s long-term loans outstanding (dLONG_RATIO) show a significant positive 22 
 
treatment effect, while the effect on changes in a firm’s short-term loans outstanding (dSHORT_RATIO) is insignificant, 
suggesting that most of the ECG loans are long-term. The size of ECG loans, which is measured by the treatment effect 
for the variable ECG_LOAN_RATIO, on average is equivalent to 10.3 percent of a firm’s total assets. The increase is 
partially reflected in the treatment effect on dB_LOAN_RATIO, which sums up the changes in both ECG loans and 
non-ECG loans extended by the same bank and on average is equivalent to 5.0 percent of a firm’s total assets. Also, 
much of the positive impact on dB_LOAN_RATIO is reflected in the increase of total loans provided by all banks 
(dB_TLOAN_RATIO) and by all creditors (dLOAN_RATIO). The above results indicate the following. First, banks that 
extend ECG loans partially offset this by decreasing the amount of non-ECG loans, resulting in an increase in the amount 
of loans outstanding that is about half the size of the amount of ECG loans. Second, other banks and creditors only 
slightly offset the increase in the amount of loans provided by banks that extend ECG loans. Overall, these results are 
consistent with the first part of Hypothesis 1 which stated that loan availability increases for users of public credit 
guarantees. 
Regarding the allocation of funds by program users, no significant treatment effects on dTANGIBLERATIO, 
dlnEMP, and dCASHRATIO are observed; that is, the increase in loans outstanding results in no significant changes in 
program users’ capital investment behavior, employment, or cash holdings. As for the performance of program users, 
many of the variables indicate a significant decline. Specifically, these are dSCORE, dSALESRATIO, and 
dCOSTRATIO. In contrast, there is no significant impact on dROA. Since the time window used for the treatment effect 
estimation here is only one year, we do not know whether the significant decline in performance among ECG users is 
only a temporary or a more lasting phenomenon. However, it is worth highlighting that the ex-post decline among ECG 
users in the amount of sales (equivalent to 12.9 percent of the total amount of assets) and in costs (11.4 percent of the 
total amount of assets) is quite sizeable. These results are inconsistent with some theoretical models that suggest that 
public credit guarantees will lead to additional investment in projects with a positive net present value and thereby 
increase economic efficiency. 
Next, panel (b) of Table 6 indicates that much of the “loan substitution” between ECG loans and non-ECG 23 
 
loans by the same bank and the deterioration in the ex-post performance of ECG program users are attributable to firms 
that obtain ECG loans from their main bank. The signs as well as the size of the treatment effects in this panel are quite 
similar to those in panel (a). In addition, dCASHRATIO becomes marginally positive. This indicates that ECG program 
users tend to hold cash reserves rather than to invest in tangible or intangible assets. Overall, the results are consistent 
with the latter part of Hypothesis 2, that is, main banks misuse the ECG program to transfer the credit risk of existing 
low-quality borrowers to the credit guarantee program. 
Finally, panel (c) examines the effects for firm-non-main bank matched observations. There are significant 
differences from the results in the previous panels. First, even though non-main banks that extended ECG loans partially 
offset the increase by reducing the amount of non-ECG loans, the extent of such offsetting behavior appears to be 
relatively small. The difference between ECG_LOAN_RATIO and dB_LOAN_RATIO in the firm-non-main bank 
matched sample is 0.019 (=0.072-0.053), while the difference in the firm-main bank matched sample is 0.057 
(=0.107-0.050). 
Second, treatment effects become insignificant or only marginally significant for dB_TLOAN_RATIO and 
dLOAN_RATIO. These results indicate that other banks appear to withdraw their non-ECG loans, which cancels out the 
positive treatment effects for ECG_LOAN_RATIO and dB_LOAN_RATIO. However, it would be hasty to conclude that 
the result contradicts the first part of Hypothesis 1, which is that public credit guarantees are expected to increase credit 
availability. The probit estimations in Table 5 indicate that the effect of LOAN_ENQUIRY on the use of ECG loans is 
negative among firms that obtain ECG loans from non-main banks. That is, firms that receive ECG loans from non-main 
banks may want to reduce their total loan balances since they have no need to procure additional funds. Part of the 
reason that we do not observe any significant treatment effects on the allocation of funds may be that there is strong 
demand for repaying non-ECG loans among the ECG users in this subsample. Neither do we observe significant 
treatment effects among ECG users with regard to the performance variables. This insignificant impact on performance 
variables can be explained by the demand for repaying previous loans among the ECG users in this subsample rather 
than the demand for capital investments. 24 
 
 
5.3. OLS regression for the relationship between ECG loans and firms’ loan availability 
  In the previous subsection, we argued that the loan “substitution” effects between ECG loans and non-ECG 
loans are more sizable in the firm-main bank matched sample. In order to reexamine the issue, we employ OLS 
estimation to gauge the impact of ECG_LOAN_RATIO (explanatory variable) on dB_LOAN_RATIO and 
dB_TLOAN_RATIO (dependent variables). We use the same set of other explanatory variables as in the probit  
estimation. 
  Table 7 presents the results, with panel (a) showing those for the subsample of firm-main bank matched 
observations and panel (b) showing those for firm-non-main bank matched observations. We focus on the coefficients on 
ECG_LOAN_RATIO. In the estimation with dB_LOAN_RATIO as the dependent variable, the coefficient on 
ECG_LOAN_RATIO in panel (a) is 0.444, while in panel (b) the coefficient is 0.905. That is, an ECG loan amount 
equivalent to one percent of a firm’s total assets provided by a main bank resulted in an increase in total loans extended 
by the same main bank equivalent to 0.4 percent of the firm’s total assets. In contrast, an ECG loan equivalent to one 
percent of a firm’s total assets provided by a non-main bank resulted in a much larger increase in total loans extended by 
the same non-main bank, namely by an amount equivalent to 0.9 percent of the firm’s total assets. For the sample of 
main bank matches, we can reject that the coefficient is significantly different from unity, while we cannot reject it for 
the sample of non-main bank matches (results not reported). These results are consistent with those obtained in the 
previous subsection, which showed that main banks reduced non-ECG loans to offset ECG loans more than non-main 
banks. This finding is consistent with the latter part of Hypothesis 2, which stated that the main bank exploits its 
informational advantage to identify low quality firms, substitutes guaranteed loans for non-guaranteed loans, and 
transfers the firms’ credit risks to the guarantee program. In contrast, in the estimation with dB_TLOAN_RATIO as the 
dependent variable, the coefficient in the firm-main bank matched sample (0.256) becomes actually larger than that in 
the firm-non-main bank matched sample (0.026 and insignificant). The results for the main bank matches are consistent 
with the first part of Hypothesis 1 in that loan availability increases for users of public credit guarantees, while this is not 25 
 
necessarily the case for the non-main bank matches. Note, however, that the results for the non-main bank matches are 
consistent with the results obtained in the previous subsection that firms that receive ECG loans from non-main banks 
may have strong demand to repay previous non-ECG loans. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This study empirically examined whether the Emergency Credit Guarantee Program introduced by the Japanese 
government in 2008 increased the availability of bank loans to small businesses and contributed to improving firm 
performance. Since these firms have limited access to other financing options such as commercial paper, corporate bonds, 
or equities, the issue is critical for small business financing. The importance of better credit availability is even greater in 
the context of the current financial crisis. Even though the credit crunch for firms is less severe in Japan than in the 
United States and Europe, the introduction of a massive credit guarantee scheme may have helped to ease financing 
conditions for small businesses.   
Our empirical findings confirm that the ECG program is generally effective in improving firms’ access to 
credit. However, we did not find firm evidence that incremental funds supplied by the ECG program help to boost 
investment by, or employment at, user firms. Nor do we find evidence that, in the one-year window that our data cover, 
the program improved the ex-post profitability or creditworthiness of ECG program users. On the contrary, we find a 
significantly negative impact of the ECG program on user firms’ creditworthiness as indicated by the decline in the TSR 
credit score. Although we cannot make solid inferences from observations spanning only a one-year period, our results 
are consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis regarding the effect of credit guarantees. 
We also find evidence that the determinants of the use of the ECG program and its economic impact differ 
depending on the extent of firm-bank relationships. In particular, we find that a relationship lender (main bank) is more 
likely to extend ECG loans to observably riskier firms and to offset partially, if not completely, the increase in ECG loans 
by a decrease in non-ECG loans. We do not find such a loan “substitution” effect when the ECG loans were extended by 
non-main banks. In addition, our treatment effect estimations based on the propensity score matching methodology find a 26 
 
deterioration of TSR credit scores only in the firm-main bank matched subsample. Taken together, these findings suggest 
that main banks exploit their informational advantage with regard to their borrowers and use the ECG program to 
transfer credit risks of low quality firms to the guarantee program. 
The Emergency Credit Guarantee Program, with its 100 percent credit guarantee, is scheduled to expire in 
March 2011 and will be replaced by the regular program, which provides a guarantee coverage of only 80 percent. 
Reducing the guarantee coverage represents a first [important] step in restraining banks, especially main banks that have 
informational advantage, from substituting credit guaranteed loans for non-guaranteed loans. Additionally, our findings 
have some policy implications for the institutional architecture of credit guarantee programs. In the literature on small 
business financing, a stable relationship between a firm and a bank is generally regarded to be beneficial in improving 
access to credit when a firm is in temporary distress. However, when combined with a credit guarantee program, close 
firm-bank relationships may have perverse effects as the credit guarantees may distort banks’ incentives. That is, a bank 
that has proprietary information on firms may exploit its advantage and extend guaranteed loans to substitute for its 
non-guaranteed loans to risky firms. 
In order to circumvent such misuse of the program by a relationship lender, several institutional changes may 
be worth considering. One potential measure to discipline financial institutions would be to introduce a program that 
differentiates lenders based on the ex-post performance of their guaranteed loans (for instance, the ex-post default rate of 
guaranteed loans). Such a scheme can, for instance, be found in the Certified and Preferred Lenders Program of the 
Small Business Administration of the United States. Limiting firms eligible for a credit guarantee program to those that 
have not established a stable relationship with a bank (e.g., newly established firms) would be an alternative way to 
prevent the abuse of the program. By excluding firms that have established close relationships with banks from the group 
of eligible firms for credit guarantees, it would be possible to prevent the kind of opportunistic behavior by banks that 
the findings of this paper suggest. 27 
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Table 1: Definitions of variables 
(a)  Outcome variables 
Loan availability 
 ECG_LOAN_RATIO  = ECG loans respondent firm obtained from a particular bank / firm’s assets 
 dB_LOAN_RATIO  = change in loans outstanding from a particular bank / firm’s assets 
 dB_TLOAN_RATIO  = change in firm’s total outstanding loans from all banks / firm’s assets 
 dLOAN_RATIO  = change in firm’s total loans outstanding / firm’s assets, consisting of short-term loans and 
bills discounted (dSHORT_RATIO) and long-term loans (dLONG_RATIO) 
Ex-post firm performance 
 dCASHRATIO  = change in cash and deposits / firm’s assets 
 dTANGIBLERATIO  = change in tangible assets / firm’s assets 
 dROA  = change in ROA (operating profits / firm’s assets), which equals dSALESRATIO (change 
in gross sales ratio) minus dCOSTRATIO (change in operating costs ratio) 
 dSCORE  = change in TSR credit score (1-100 points) 
 dlnEMP  = change in number of employees in logarithm 
 dRATE  = change in interest payments / firm’s total loans outstanding 
(b)  Determinant variables 
Characteristics of credit guarantees 
 ECG_DUM  1 if firm obtained an ECG loan from a bank, 0 otherwise 
 RCG_DUM  1 if firm obtained a regular credit guarantee program loan from a bank, 0 otherwise 
Firm characteristics 
 LOAN_ENQUIRY  1 if firm asked a bank to extend a loan within a year, 0 otherwise 
 SHARPERATIO  Sharpe ratio: ROA / Std. deviation of ROA, where ROA=operating profits / total assets.  
The standard deviation of ROA is calculated for years available in the TSR database which 
dates back from 2007 to as old as 1982. 
 SCORE  TSR credit score (1-100 points; a higher score indicates greater creditworthiness) 
 CAPRATIO_NG  1 if firm’s capital-asset ratio is negative (firm has negative net worth), 0 otherwise 
 LOANRATIO  Firm’s total loans outstanding / total assets 
 LN_SALES  Log of gross annual sales   
 LN_FIRMAGE  Log of firm age 
 IND1-IND9  Industry dummies: (1) construction, (2) manufacturing, (3) communication and 
information, (4) transportation, (5) wholesale, (6) retail, (7) real estate, (8) services, and (9) 
other 
Bank characteristics 
 B_REGIONAL  1 if a bank is either a regional bank, a second regional bank, or a Shinkin bank, 0 otherwise
 BIS  Capital asset ratio based on Basel capital framework 
 BANKSHARE  Bank’s share of branches within the prefecture of a borrowing firm 
 HHI  Herfindahl Index computed based on the shares of bank branches within a prefecture of a 
borrowing firm 
Characteristics of bank-firm relationships 
 B_MAIN  1 if a bank is a main bank, 0 otherwise 
 B_CONTACT  Index variable indicating the frequency of meetings between a borrower firm and a bank: 
(1) daily, (2) weekly, (3) several times in a week, (4) monthly, (5) once in 2-3 months, (6) 
semi-annually, (7) annually, (8) less than annually, 9: no direct meetings 30 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics: ECG users and non-ECG users 
This table presents summary statistics of the variables used in the probit estimations (Table 5). Definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. The block of columns labeled “ECG_DUM=1” 
reports summary statistics for firm-bank matches in which firms used ECG loans. The block of columns labeled “ECG_DUM=0” reports summary statistics for firm-bank matches in which firms did 
not use ECG loans. 
Entire sample N mean sd min p50 max N mean sd p50 N mean sd p50
Characteristics of credit guarantees
ECG_DUM 2498 0.146 0.353 0 0 1 365 1.000 0.000 1 2133 0.000 0.000 0
RCG_DUM 2498 0.394 0.489 0 0 1 365 0.762 0.427 1 2133 0.331 0.471 0
Firm characteristics
LOAN_ENQUIRY 2498 0.353 0.478 0 0 1 365 0.463 0.499 0 2133 0.334 0.472 0
SHARPERATIO 2498 0.077 1.030 -10.032 0.079 6.117 365 -0.170 0.922 -0.164 2133 0.119 1.041 0.127
SCORE 2498 55.251 6.521 27 54 87 365 51.397 4.445 51 2133 55.910 6.592 55
CAPRATIO_NG 2498 0.048 0.214 0 0 1 365 0.079 0.271 0 2133 0.043 0.202 0
LOANRATIO 2498 0.393 0.266 0.000 0.360 3.639 365 0.547 0.241 0.548 2133 0.366 0.261 0.326
lnSALES 2498 7.484 1.652 0.000 7.333 14.352 365 6.723 1.214 6.653 2133 7.615 1.682 7.474
lnFIRMAGE 2498 3.637 0.516 1.946 3.761 4.787 365 3.536 0.524 3.638 2133 3.655 0.512 3.784
IND1 2498 0.235 0.424 0 0 1 365 0.315 0.465 0 2133 0.221 0.415 0
IND2 2498 0.257 0.437 0 0 1 365 0.238 0.427 0 2133 0.260 0.439 0
IND3 2498 0.032 0.177 0 0 1 365 0.022 0.147 0 2133 0.034 0.182 0
IND4 2498 0.037 0.188 0 0 1 365 0.030 0.171 0 2133 0.038 0.191 0
IND5 2498 0.227 0.419 0 0 1 365 0.195 0.396 0 2133 0.233 0.423 0
IND6 2498 0.097 0.296 0 0 1 365 0.101 0.302 0 2133 0.096 0.295 0
IND7 2498 0.020 0.140 0 0 1 365 0.019 0.137 0 2133 0.020 0.141 0
IND8 2498 0.004 0.066 0 0 1 365 0.003 0.052 0 2133 0.005 0.068 0
IND9 2498 0.091 0.287 0 0 1 365 0.077 0.266 0 2133 0.093 0.291 0
Bank characteristics
B_REGIONAL 2498 0.716 0.451 0 1 1 365 0.847 0.361 1 2133 0.693 0.461 1
B_REGIONAL*BIS 2498 7.801 5.913 -11.570 10.050 35.300 365 9.369 4.962 10.210 2133 7.533 6.021 9.910
BIS 2498 11.113 3.344 -11.570 11.410 35.300 365 11.070 2.974 10.750 2133 11.120 3.403 11.440
BANKSHARE 2498 0.136 0.114 0.000 0.111 0.462 365 0.160 0.120 0.132 2133 0.132 0.112 0.106
HHI 2498 0.107 0.066 0.037 0.100 0.292 365 0.113 0.068 0.100 2133 0.106 0.065 0.091
Characteristics of bank-firm relationship
B_MAIN*ENQUIRY 2498 0.239 0.427 0 0 1 365 0.441 0.497 0 2133 0.204 0.403 0
B_MAIN 2498 0.601 0.490 0 1 1 365 0.871 0.335 1 2133 0.555 0.497 1




Table 3: Summary statistics: transactions with main-bank 
This table presents summary statistics of the variables used in the probit estimations (Table 5) for firm-main bank matches. Definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. The block of columns 
labeled “ECG_DUM=1” reports summary statistics for firm-bank matches in which firms used ECG loans. The block of columns under “ECG_DUM=0” reports summary statistics for firm-bank 
matches in which firms did not use ECG loans. 
B_MAIN=1 N mean sd min p50 max N mean sd p50 N mean sd p50
Characteristics of credit guarantees
ECG_DUM 1502 0.212 0.409 0 0 1 318 1.000 0.000 1 1184 0.000 0.000 0
RCG_DUM 1502 0.426 0.495 0 0 1 318 0.783 0.413 1 1184 0.330 0.470 0
Firm characteristics
LOAN_ENQUIRY 1502 0.397 0.490 0 0 1 318 0.506 0.501 1 1184 0.368 0.483 0
SCORE 1502 55.147 6.469 31 54 87 318 51.116 4.411 51 1184 56.230 6.507 55
CAPRATIO_NG 1502 0.051 0.221 0 0 1 318 0.088 0.284 0 1184 0.041 0.199 0
LOANRATIO 1502 0.394 0.271 0.000 0.360 3.639 318 0.555 0.242 0.557 1184 0.350 0.262 0.311
lnSALES 1502 7.435 1.642 0.000 7.304 14.352 318 6.676 1.212 6.615 1184 7.639 1.682 7.512
lnFIRMAGE 1502 3.642 0.517 1.946 3.761 4.787 318 3.542 0.515 3.638 1184 3.669 0.514 3.784
IND1 1502 0.242 0.428 0 0 1 318 0.333 0.472 0 1184 0.217 0.412 0
IND2 1502 0.256 0.436 0 0 1 318 0.239 0.427 0 1184 0.260 0.439 0
IND3 1502 0.031 0.172 0 0 1 318 0.009 0.097 0 1184 0.036 0.187 0
IND4 1502 0.037 0.190 0 0 1 318 0.031 0.175 0 1184 0.039 0.193 0
IND5 1502 0.228 0.419 0 0 1 318 0.198 0.399 0 1184 0.236 0.425 0
IND6 1502 0.098 0.297 0 0 1 318 0.094 0.293 0 1184 0.099 0.299 0
IND7 1502 0.019 0.138 0 0 1 318 0.019 0.136 0 1184 0.019 0.138 0
IND8 1502 0.004 0.063 0 0 1 318 0.003 0.056 0 1184 0.004 0.065 0
IND9 1502 0.086 0.280 0 0 1 318 0.072 0.259 0 1184 0.090 0.286 0
Bank characteristics
B_REGIONAL 1502 0.744 0.436 0 1 1 318 0.874 0.332 1 1184 0.709 0.454 1
B_REGIONAL*BIS 1502 8.176 5.725 -11.570 10.100 35.170 318 9.664 4.777 10.340 1184 7.776 5.892 10.100
BIS 1502 11.151 3.181 -11.570 11.420 35.170 318 11.063 3.078 10.710 1184 11.174 3.208 11.440
BANKSHARE 1502 0.158 0.120 0.000 0.119 0.462 318 0.169 0.123 0.153 1184 0.155 0.120 0.118
HHI 1502 0.112 0.067 0.037 0.100 0.292 318 0.117 0.069 0.103 1184 0.110 0.066 0.100
Characteristics of bank-firm relationship
B_MAIN*ENQUIRY 1502 0.397 0.490 0 0 1 318 0.506 0.501 1 1184 0.368 0.483 0
B_MAIN 1502 1.000 0.000 1 1 1 318 1.000 0.000 1 1184 1.000 0.000 1





Table 4: Summary statistics: transactions with non-main-bank 
This table presents summary statistics of the variables used in the probit estimations (Table 5) for firm-non-main bank matches. Definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. The block of 
columns labeled “ECG_DUM=1” reports summary statistics for firm-bank matches in which firms used ECG loans. The block of columns labeled “ECG_DUM=0” reports summary statistics for 
firm-bank matches in which firms did not use ECG loans. 
B_MAIN=0 N mean sd min p50 max N mean sd p50 N mean sd p50
Characteristics of credit guarantees
ECG_DUM 996 0.047 0.212 0 0 1 47 1.000 0.000 1 949 0.000 0.000 0
RCG_DUM 996 0.345 0.476 0 0 1 47 0.617 0.491 1 949 0.332 0.471 0
Firm characteristics
LOAN_ENQUIRY 996 0.286 0.452 0 0 1 47 0.170 0.380 0 949 0.292 0.455 0
SCORE 996 55.408 6.598 27 54 87 47 53.298 4.242 52 949 55.512 6.678 55
CAPRATIO_NG 996 0.043 0.203 0 0 1 47 0.021 0.146 0 949 0.044 0.206 0
LOANRATIO 996 0.392 0.258 0.000 0.360 2.026 47 0.489 0.224 0.495 949 0.387 0.258 0.352
lnSALES 996 7.559 1.666 0.000 7.374 13.875 47 7.041 1.195 6.835 949 7.585 1.682 7.413
lnFIRMAGE 996 3.630 0.515 1.946 3.761 4.787 47 3.495 0.590 3.664 949 3.637 0.510 3.761
IND1 996 0.224 0.417 0 0 1 47 0.191 0.398 0 949 0.226 0.418 0
IND2 996 0.258 0.438 0 0 1 47 0.234 0.428 0 949 0.259 0.438 0
IND3 996 0.035 0.184 0 0 1 47 0.106 0.312 0 949 0.032 0.175 0
IND4 996 0.036 0.187 0 0 1 47 0.021 0.146 0 949 0.037 0.189 0
IND5 996 0.227 0.419 0 0 1 47 0.170 0.380 0 949 0.230 0.421 0
IND6 996 0.095 0.294 0 0 1 47 0.149 0.360 0 949 0.093 0.290 0
IND7 996 0.021 0.144 0 0 1 47 0.021 0.146 0 949 0.021 0.144 0
IND8 996 0.005 0.071 0 0 1 47 0.000 0.000 0 949 0.005 0.072 0
IND9 996 0.098 0.298 0 0 1 47 0.106 0.312 0 949 0.098 0.297 0
Bank characteristics
B_REGIONAL 996 0.673 0.469 0 1 1 47 0.660 0.479 1 949 0.673 0.469 1
B_REGIONAL*BIS 996 7.236 6.146 -11.570 9.510 35.300 47 7.368 5.734 9.480 949 7.229 6.169 9.510
BIS 996 11.055 3.576 -11.570 11.210 35.300 47 11.120 2.162 10.780 949 11.052 3.633 11.210
BANKSHARE 996 0.102 0.094 0.000 0.074 0.444 47 0.100 0.082 0.072 949 0.103 0.095 0.074
HHI 996 0.099 0.063 0.037 0.080 0.292 47 0.083 0.054 0.066 949 0.100 0.063 0.080
Characteristics of bank-firm relationship
B_MAIN*ENQUIRY 996 0.000 0.000 0 0 0 47 0.000 0.000 0 949 0.000 0.000 0
B_MAIN 996 0.000 0.000 0 0 0 47 0.000 0.000 0 949 0.000 0.000 0





Table 5: Probit estimations on the determinants of the use of ECG loans 
This table presents the probit estimation results for the subsample of firm-main bank matches (left column), the subsample of firm-non-main bank matches (center), and all firm-bank matches (right). 
Definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. ***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
Estimation method: Probit
Dependent variable: ECG_DUM Coef. Std. Err z Coef. Std. Err z Coef. Std. Err  z
Characteristics of credit guarantees
RCG_DUM 0.685 *** 0.094 7.310 0.379 ** 0.165 2.300 0.621 *** 0.080 7.730
Firm characteristics
LOAN_ENQUIRY 0.220
*** 0.086 2.560 -0.373
* 0.196 -1.900 -0.439
** 0.190 -2.300
SHARPERATIO -0.025 0.046 -0.530 -0.090 0.084 -1.070 -0.039 0.040 -0.990
SCORE -0.043 *** 0.010 -4.150 -0.014 0.018 -0.740 -0.035 *** 0.009 -3.920
CAPRATIO_NG -0.595
*** 0.183 -3.240 -0.842
* 0.471 -1.790 -0.612
*** 0.163 -3.750
LOANRATIO 0.770
*** 0.181 4.260 0.724
** 0.370 1.960 0.769
*** 0.159 4.830
lnSALES -0.093 *** 0.036 -2.540 -0.026 0.064 -0.400 -0.079 *** 0.031 -2.530
lnFIRMAGE -0.054 0.089 -0.610 -0.139 0.158 -0.880 -0.074 0.076 -0.970
Bank characteristics
B_REGIONAL -2.582
** 1.253 -2.060 -4.099
*** 1.502 -2.730 -3.292
*** 0.964 -3.410
B_REGIONAL*BIS 0.240
** 0.110 2.170 0.352
*** 0.133 2.660 0.294
*** 0.085 3.460
BIS -0.239 ** 0.110 -2.180 -0.345 *** 0.130 -2.650 -0.292 *** 0.084 -3.470
BANKSHARE 0.743 0.499 1.490 0.491 0.997 0.490 0.833 ** 0.431 1.930
HHI -1.542
* 0.937 -1.650 -3.155
** 1.600 -1.970 -1.894
** 0.786 -2.410
Characteristics of bank-firm relationship
B_MAIN*ENQUIRY 0.663 *** 0.205 3.230
B_MAIN 0.645 *** 0.103 6.270
B_CONTACT -0.034 0.033 -1.040 -0.160
** 0.068 -2.360 -0.064
** 0.029 -2.200
constant 4.201
*** 1.443 2.910 3.891
** 1.948 2.000 3.899
*** 1.140 3.420
Industry_dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1502 991 2498
LRchi2 338.6 51.43 501.73
Prob > chi2 0 0 0
Pseudo R2 0.22 0.14 0.24
Log likelihood -606.07 -163.44 -788.09
B_MAIN=1 B_MAIN=0 Entire sample
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Table 6: Treatment effect estimations on loan availability for, and ex-post performance of, ECG loan users 
These tables present the estimation results for treatment effects on the loan availability for, and ex-post performance, of ECG loan users. Definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. ***, **, * 
indicate a significance level of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
(a)  Entire sample 
Entire sample
Variable Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat
ECG_LOAN_RATIO Unmatched 0.103 0.000 0.103 *** 0.003 33.770
ATT 0.103 0.000 0.103 *** 0.008 13.610
dB_LOAN_RATIO Unmatched 0.050 0.008 0.042 *** 0.008 5.380
ATT 0.050 0.000 0.050 *** 0.010 4.850
dB_TLOAN_RATIO Unmatched 0.042 0.009 0.033 *** 0.011 3.120
ATT 0.042 0.001 0.041 *** 0.013 3.250
dLOAN_RATIO Unmatched 0.026 0.003 0.022 *** 0.007 3.240
ATT 0.026 -0.010 0.036 *** 0.009 3.920
dSHORT_RATIO Unmatched -0.013 -0.006 -0.007 0.005 -1.340
ATT -0.013 -0.015 0.002 0.007 0.230
dLONG_RATIO Unmatched 0.039 0.009 0.029 *** 0.005 5.760
ATT 0.039 0.005 0.034 *** 0.007 4.810
dCASHRATIO Unmatched 0.014 0.007 0.006 0.005 1.340
ATT 0.014 0.003 0.010 0.006 1.590
dTANGIBLERATIO Unmatched -0.006 0.000 -0.006 0.005 -1.240
ATT -0.006 -0.001 -0.005 0.006 -0.800
dROA Unmatched -0.020 -0.013 -0.008 0.006 -1.380
ATT -0.020 -0.005 -0.015 0.010 -1.530
dSALESRATIO Unmatched -0.141 -0.018 -0.123 *** 0.030 -4.060
ATT -0.141 -0.012 -0.129 *** 0.039 -3.270
dCOSTRATIO Unmatched -0.120 -0.005 -0.115 *** 0.030 -3.850
ATT -0.120 -0.006 -0.114 *** 0.040 -2.880
dSCORE Unmatched -1.132 -0.975 -0.157 0.166 -0.940
ATT -1.132 -0.499 -0.633 *** 0.214 -2.950
dlnEMP Unmatched -0.027 -0.013 -0.013 0.018 -0.740
ATT -0.027 -0.018 -0.009 0.018 -0.520
dRATE Unmatched -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.004 -0.270
ATT -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.004 -0.620  35 
 
(b)  Subsample of firm-main bank matches 
B_MAIN=1
Variable Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat
ECG_LOAN_RATIO Unmatched 0.107 0.000 0.107 *** 0.004 26.600
ATT 0.107 0.000 0.107 *** 0.008 12.870
dB_LOAN_RATIO Unmatched 0.049 0.007 0.042 *** 0.009 4.620
ATT 0.049 -0.002 0.050 *** 0.012 4.360
dB_TLOAN_RATIO Unmatched 0.044 0.008 0.036 *** 0.012 3.120
ATT 0.044 0.003 0.041 *** 0.014 2.980
dLOAN_RATIO Unmatched 0.024 0.004 0.020 *** 0.008 2.660
ATT 0.024 -0.010 0.034 *** 0.010 3.390
dSHORT_RATIO Unmatched -0.015 -0.004 -0.011 * 0.006 -1.770
ATT -0.015 -0.014 -0.001 0.008 -0.080
dLONG_RATIO Unmatched 0.039 0.008 0.031 *** 0.006 5.540
ATT 0.039 0.005 0.034 *** 0.008 4.570
dCASHRATIO Unmatched 0.015 0.007 0.008 0.005 1.420
ATT 0.015 0.003 0.011 * 0.007 1.690
dTANGIBLERATIO Unmatched -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 0.006 -0.170
ATT -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 0.007 -0.260
dROA Unmatched -0.020 -0.011 -0.009 0.007 -1.390
ATT -0.020 -0.005 -0.015 0.011 -1.350
dSALESRATIO Unmatched -0.151 -0.014 -0.137 *** 0.035 -3.900
ATT -0.151 -0.013 -0.138 *** 0.044 -3.100
dCOSTRATIO Unmatched -0.131 -0.003 -0.128 *** 0.035 -3.670
ATT -0.131 -0.008 -0.123 *** 0.045 -2.740
dSCORE Unmatched -1.140 -0.930 -0.210 0.184 -1.140
ATT -1.140 -0.506 -0.634 *** 0.234 -2.710
dlnEMP Unmatched -0.023 -0.007 -0.016 0.021 -0.760
ATT -0.023 -0.020 -0.003 0.021 -0.130
dRATE Unmatched -0.002 -0.004 0.002 0.005 0.370
ATT -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.004 -0.210  36 
 
(c)  Subsample of firm-non-main bank matches 
B_MAIN=0
Variable Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat
ECG_LOAN_RATIO Unmatched 0.072 0.000 0.072 *** 0.003 24.250
ATT 0.072 0.000 0.072 *** 0.015 4.880
dB_LOAN_RATIO Unmatched 0.057 0.007 0.050 *** 0.018 2.730
ATT 0.057 0.004 0.053 *** 0.019 2.780
dB_TLOAN_RATIO Unmatched 0.023 0.013 0.010 0.029 0.330
ATT 0.023 0.009 0.014 0.022 0.640
dLOAN_RATIO Unmatched 0.034 0.007 0.026 0.017 1.510
ATT 0.034 0.001 0.033 * 0.019 1.700
dSHORT_RATIO Unmatched -0.001 -0.008 0.007 0.013 0.570
ATT -0.001 -0.018 0.017 0.014 1.180
dLONG_RATIO Unmatched 0.035 0.016 0.019 0.013 1.420
ATT 0.035 0.019 0.016 0.018 0.890
dCASHRATIO Unmatched 0.007 0.008 -0.001 0.013 -0.070
ATT 0.007 0.007 0.000 0.021 0.000
dTANGIBLERATIO Unmatched -0.021 0.001 -0.022 * 0.013 -1.800
ATT -0.021 -0.002 -0.019 * 0.010 -1.990
dROA Unmatched -0.021 -0.017 -0.005 0.018 -0.250
ATT -0.021 -0.023 0.001 0.014 0.100
dSALESRATIO Unmatched -0.074 -0.037 -0.037 0.074 -0.500
ATT -0.074 -0.051 -0.023 0.071 -0.320
dCOSTRATIO Unmatched -0.053 -0.021 -0.032 0.073 -0.440
ATT -0.053 -0.028 -0.024 0.068 -0.350
dSCORE Unmatched -1.069 -1.092 0.023 0.484 0.050
ATT -1.069 -0.944 -0.125 0.444 -0.280
dlnEMP Unmatched -0.051 -0.025 -0.026 0.042 -0.630
ATT -0.051 -0.024 -0.027 0.022 -1.250
dRATE Unmatched -0.011 -0.001 -0.010 0.007 -1.400
ATT -0.011 0.000 -0.011 0.007 -1.450  37 
 
Table 7. OLS estimations on loan availability 
These tables present OLS estimation results on loan availability. Definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. ***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
(a)  Subsample of firm-main bank matches 
Estimation method: OLS
Dependent variable: Coef.       t Coef.      t
Characteristics of credit guarantees
ECG_LOAN_RATIO 0.444 *** 7.160 0.256 *** 3.230
RP_DUM 0.002 0.250 0.000 0.030
Firm characteristics
LOAN_ENQUIRY 0.023 *** 2.880 0.016 1.590
SHARPERATIO -0.001 -0.170 -0.003 -0.490
SCORE 0.000 -0.370 0.001 0.840
CAPRATIO_NG 0.020 0.930 -0.020 -0.740
LOANRATIO -0.058 *** -3.260 -0.024 -1.040
lnSALES 0.003 0.790 0.004 0.940
lnFIRMAGE 0.004 0.450 -0.018 * -1.680
Bank characteristics
B_REGIONAL 0.009 0.110 0.005 0.050
B_REGIONAL*BIS 0.001 0.190 0.002 0.260
BIS -0.003 -0.360 -0.003 -0.290
BANKSHARE 0.037 0.810 -0.005 -0.090
HHI -0.084 -1.020 -0.206 ** -1.960
Characteristics of bank-firm relationship
B_MAIN*ENQUIRY 0.000 -0.160 0.003 0.880
constant 0.012 0.120 -0.032 -0.250
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Number of observations 931 931
F value 3.51 1.58
Prob > F 0 0.04





(b)  Subsample of firm-non-main bank matches 
Estimation method: OLS
Dependent variable: Coef.      t Coef.       t
Characteristics of credit guarantees
ECG_LOAN_RATIO 0.905 *** 4.730 0.026 0.090
RP_DUM -0.041 *** -4.230 -0.020 -1.300
Firm characteristics
LOAN_ENQUIRY 0.001 0.070 0.000 0.020
SHARPERATIO 0.002 0.480 0.001 0.110
SCORE 0.000 0.570 0.001 0.590
CAPRATIO_NG -0.038 -1.590 -0.084 ** -2.260
LOANRATIO 0.054 *** 2.630 0.036 1.120
lnSALES -0.002 -0.650 0.000 0.010
lnFIRMAGE -0.008 -0.930 -0.009 -0.630
Bank characteristics
B_REGIONAL -0.096 -1.210 0.046 0.370
B_REGIONAL*BIS 0.009 1.260 -0.003 -0.280
BIS -0.008 -1.150 0.002 0.220
BANKSHARE 0.038 0.790 0.004 0.060
HHI -0.118 * -1.650 -0.132 -1.170
Characteristics of bank-firm relationship
B_MAIN*ENQUIRY -0.003 -0.860 -0.006 -1.250
constant 0.110 0.990 0.214 1.230
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Number of observations 625 625
F value 2.75 1.32
Prob > F 0 0.14
Adj R-squared 0.06 0.01
B_MAIN=0 B_MAIN=0
dB_LOAN_RATIO dB_TLOAN_RATIO
 